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Abstract. In this paper, we present a novel system for selling bundles
of news items. Through the system, customers bargain with the seller
over the price and quality of the delivered goods. The advantage of the
developed system is that it allows for a high degree of flexibility in the
price, quality, and content of the offered bundles. The price, quality, and
content of the delivered goods may, for example, differ based on daily
dynamics and personal interests of customers. Autonomous “software
agents” execute the negotiation on behalf of the users of the system.
To perform the actual negotiation these agents make use of bargaining
strategies. We decompose bargaining strategies into concession strategies
and Pareto efficient search strategies. Additionally, we introduce the or-
thogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto search strategies. We
show through computer experiments that the use of these Pareto search
strategies will result in very efficient bargaining outcomes. Moreover, the
system is set up such that it is actually in the best interest of the cus-
tomer to have their agent adhere to this approach of disentangling the
bargaining strategy.
1 Introduction
Personalization of information goods becomes more and more a key component
of a successful electronic business strategy [1]. The challenge is to develop sys-
tems that can deliver a high level of personalization combined with, whenever
possible, a high adaptability to changing circumstances. In this paper we develop
a system which can attain these properties through the manner in which it sells
information goods.
We consider the novel approach of selling bundles of news items through a
system that allows for bargaining over the price and quality of the delivered
goods. Bundling of information goods has many potential benefits including
complementarities among the bundle components, and sorting consumers ac-
cording to their valuation (cf. [2] and the references therein). The advantage of
the developed system is that it allows for a high degree of flexibility in the price,
quality, and content of the offered bundles. The price, quality, and content of the
delivered goods may, for example, differ based on daily dynamics and personal
interest of customers.
The system as developed is capable of taking into account business related
constraints. More specifically, it tries to ensure that customers perceive the bar-
gaining outcomes as being “fair” by having customers end up with equivalent
offers whenever that seems fair. Partly because of this fairness constraint the
actual bargaining process is not really one-to-one bargaining between seller and
customer but instead is one-to-many (i.e., between seller and customers).
To accelerate the negotiation process, customers can initiate concurrent nego-
tiation threads for the same bundle with differences in the quality of the delivered
bundles. The thread in which the agreement is reached first determines the final
bargaining outcome.
In the developed system, autonomous “software agents” perform (part of) the
negotiation on behalf of the users of the system. These software agents bargain
over a multi-issue price (the price is actually a tariff with a fixed and variable
component).
To enable efficient multi-issue bargaining outcomes, we decompose the bar-
gaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto search strategies. Addi-
tionally, we introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto
search strategies. We show through computer experiments that the respective
use of these two Pareto search strategies by the two bargainers will result in very
efficient bargaining outcomes (i.e., these outcomes closely approximate Pareto-
efficient bargaining solutions).
In the system the seller agent uses a Pareto search strategy (i.e., the orthogonal-
DF) combined with a concession strategy. Although the customer is free to choose
other bargaining strategies, the system is set up such that it is actually in the
best interest of the customer to have their agent also use a Pareto search strategy
(i.e, the orthogonal strategy) combined with a concession strategy.
In Section 2 we discuss the developed system at a more conceptual level. In
Section 3 we discuss the customer and seller agent in greater detail. Further-
more, we discuss the type of bargaining strategies these agents use. In Section
4 we study in greater detail the Pareto search aspects of bargaining. Through
computer experiments we investigate the efficiency of the introduced bargaining
approach. (Note that for this purpose it is not necessary to simulate the entire
system as developed, it suffices to consider one-to-one bargaining only.) In Sec-
tion 5 we discuss the results of the paper and relate the paper to the relevant
literature. Conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 A System for Selling Information Goods
2.1 Problem Statement
The goal is to develop a system for the sales of bundles of news items where
customers bargain over the price and quality of the delivered goods. The nego-
tiated contract applies to a fixed time interval, which is typically a short period
of time, e.g., a single day. There are roughly three possibilities for implementing
the starting time of the negotiation process: customers can negotiate a contract
before the news arises, after the news arises, or while the news arises. The system
is set up in such a way that all three possibilities can be implemented.
The value customers attach to news items may fluctuate heavily due to daily
dynamics. Moreover, there may be wide differences in personal interests of cus-
tomers. The advantage of the developed system is that it allows for a high degree
of flexibility in the price, quality, and content of the offered bundles. The price,
quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for example, differ based on
daily dynamics and personal interest of customers.
2.2 Bundles of Information Goods
The system sells bundles of news items which become available during a prede-
fined and fixed time interval (e.g., a day). Within the system, prices vary based
on the content and “quality of service” of the bundle. A bundle content defines
which types of news categories the bundle contains. The system distinguishes
between k categories. Within a category the system distinguishes between two
quality of service levels: i.e., a customer pays a fixed price for either receiving
headlines or complete news articles. In the former case we speak of a category
with low quality of service, whereas in the latter case we speak of a category with
high quality of service. Moreover, with the quality of service (or just quality) of
a bundle we actually mean the quality of service specified per category.
A customer bargains with the seller over the bundle tariff. The negotiated
tariff is a two-part tariff with a fixed and variable price. The fixed price (pf )
is the price a customer pays for receiving the bundle content with the specified
quality of service. Moreover, the variable price (pv) is the price the customer pays
for reading a full article whenever the quality of service only specifies delivery
of the article headline.
Consider, for example, the bundle content religion, culture, and politics,
where the category religion has a high quality of service and the other two have
a low quality of service. Then the customer pays a fixed price for receiving all
the full articles in the category religion and only the headlines of all the articles
which do not belong to the category religion but do belong to the other two
categories. Moreover, the variable price is the price the customer pays whenever
she wants to read the full article of a news item that belongs to the categories
culture or politics (and does not belong to the category religion).
2.3 Bargaining with Software Agents
We employ the paradigm of “software agents,” where pieces of autonomous soft-
ware perform (part of) the negotiating on behalf of the users of the system.
Customers and seller instruct their agent through a user interface (UI). The
agents conduct the actual negotiation. Figure 1 depicts, at a high abstraction
level, the bargaining process between a customer and the seller.
SellerCustomer
Agent
Seller
UI
Seller
Customer
Agent
Customer
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Fig. 1. The one-to-one bargaining process
2.4 Bargaining Process
Bargaining occurs in an alternating exchange of offers and counter offers, typ-
ically initiated by the customer. An offer specifies the fixed price, the variable
price (uniform for all low quality of service categories), the bundle content, and
also the desired quality of service of the information for each category sepa-
rately. The bargaining process continues until an agreement is reached or one of
the bargainers terminates the process. Based on this bargaining process, figure
2 draws the bargaining protocol the customer agents and seller agent use to do
the actual bargaining.
1: propose(Offer, Precondition)
2: abort-bargaining
2: accept-proposal(Offer, Precondition) 
2: propose (Offer, Precondition)
3: abort-bargaining
3: accept-proposal(Offer, Precondition)
3: propose(Offer, Precondition)
Responder = Customer or SellerInitiator = Seller or Customer
 
Fig. 2. The agents bargaining protocol
To accelerate the negotiation process, we allow concurrent negotiation threads
for the same bundle content with different quality of service. The customer can
therefore submit several offers at the same time. In order to discern between
threads, each thread must have a different quality configuration for the cate-
gories where a quality configuration specifies the quality of service for all the
bundle categories. The seller can only respond by varying the fixed and variable
price. The thread in which the agreement is reached first determines the tariff
and quality configuration for the desired categories.
2.5 Fairness & One-to-Many Bargaining
A possible drawback of bargaining is that two customers may end up paying a
substantially different price for very similar bundles. Customers may perceive
this as unfair. This is an important concern for the seller, since customers may
become dissatisfied or stop using the system altogether.
In the system a notion of fairness is incorporated into the bargaining strategy
the seller agent uses. More specifically, within a limited timeframe the seller agent
makes equivalent offers to customers who are interested in identical bundles.
For offers that specify identical bundles, the actual tariff may still differ from
customer to customer. Fairness, however, ensures that the expected revenue of
these tariffs is identical for all (counter) offers submitted by the seller agent;
the expected revenue (R) of a tariff (pf , pv) for a particular bundle is defined as
follows:
R = pf + pv · ρ, (1)
where ρ denotes the expected number of articles read in the low quality of service
categories (for the average customer). The expected revenue can, however, vary
through time. The offer equivalence therefore only holds within a limited time
frame. Note that beside “fairness” also other business side-constraints may be
implemented. The actual way in which side-constraints, such as fairness, are
implemented may be important because it can alter the strategic behavior of
customers. It is however beyond the scope of the paper to discuss these issues.
The actual bargaining process between seller and customers is not really
one-to-one bargaining between seller and customer but instead is one-to-many.
On the one hand, the seller can use his experience in other ongoing bargaining
processes between customers to adjust his bargaining strategy; under true one-
to-one bargaining the bargaining strategy only depends on the moves of the
direct opponent. On the other hand, fairness and/or other side-constraints limit
the bargaining options of the seller. These limitations do not apply under true
one-to-one bargaining. Figure 3 depicts the one-to-many bargaining process and
the possibility of parallel negotiation threads between a customer and the seller.
3 Agents & Bargaining
3.1 Agents
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Fig. 3. The one-to-many bargaining with parallel threads
Seller agent Bargaining with a customer is done based on the seller agent’s
desired aspiration level expressed in expected utils. We define the expected utility
u of the seller agent as the expected revenue from selling a bundle given pf and
pv (see also equation 1), i.e., u(pf , pv) = pf +pv ·ρ. We assume that all costs are
sunk, i.e., there are no transaction costs. Recall from section 2.5 that ρ denotes
the number of expected articles read in the low quality of service categories. The
agent can assess the expected number of articles read based on, for example,
aggregate past sales data.
Due to the fairness constraint, the seller agent cannot charge different prices
to different individuals for identical bundles (within the same time frame). The
seller agent can indirectly discriminate between different customers, however,
based on differences in the preferred bundle content and/or quality of service.
In the system, the seller can discriminate by varying for example the desired ex-
pected utility for different combinations of quality of service and bundle content.
Customer Agent The customer agent acts on behalf of the customer. The cus-
tomer can indicate her preferences by specifying, for each information category
she is interested in, the amount of articles she expects to read. The customer
can furthermore select between several negotiation strategies to be used by the
agent and specify a maximum budget bmax. The budget provides the agent with
a mandate for the negotiation; the total expected costs should not exceed bmax.
Given a tariff (pf , pv) for a particular bundle, the customer’s expected utility
is defined as u(pf , pv) = bmax − (pf + pv · ρ). The second part of the equation is
identical to seller’s expected revenue (see equation (1)). However, ρ, the number
of expected articles read in the low quality of service categories, refers now to
the expectation of the individual customer. Given the utility the agent is able to
translate the customer’s preferences into offers and also respond to the seller’s
offers as to maximize the expected utility.
The negotiation protocol allows for multiple negotiation threads for the same
bundle content (see Section 2.4). Given a bundle content with n categories, in
principle 2n threads are possible (by varying the quality of service for each cat-
egory). The customer agent, however, selects only a limited number of combina-
tions based on the customer’s preferences, to reduce the amount of communica-
tion. In the current system the customer agent initiates n+1 threads. In the first
thread the quality of service for all categories is set to low. In the second thread,
only the quality of service for the category with the highest expected articles
read is set to high. In the third thread, this is done for the two categories with
the first and second highest expected articles read, and so on. Within a thread,
a fixed price and a variable price are negotiated.
3.2 Decomposing Bargaining Strategy
The customer agents and seller agent contain various bargaining strategies to
do the actual bargaining over the two-part tariff. These strategies make use of
the notion of a utility function to represent the bargainers’ preferences for the
various tariffs. We decompose bargaining strategies into concession strategies
and “Pareto search” strategies.
Concession strategies determine what the desired utility level of an offer
will be given a particular sequence of offers and counter offers. Algorithms that
implement Pareto search strategies determine, given a particular utility level and
a particular history of offers and counter offers, what the multi-issue offer will
be, i.e., the fixed price pf and the variable price pv of the two part tariff. In terms
of a multivariable utility function a counter offer entails both a movement off
the iso-utility line and a movement along the iso-utility line. (Given a specified
utility level, an iso-utily line specifies all the pf and pv points which generate
identical utility.) Concession strategies determine the movement of an iso-utility
line; Pareto search strategies determine the movement along an iso-utility line.
Pareto search strategies aim at reaching agreement as soon as the respective
“concession” strategies permit this. Therefore it may be good for both parties
to use it. In more economic terms a negotiated tariff is called Pareto efficient if
it is impossible to change the tariff without making one of the bargainers worse
off, i.e., one of the bargainers will always attach a lower (or equal) utility to
the adjusted tariff. From a system design perspective Pareto efficiency of the
negotiated tariffs is clearly desirable.
In Section 3.3 we introduce a particular class of Pareto search algorithms.
The experiments in Section 4 show that if the seller agent uses this Pareto search
algorithm and customer agents use a similar Pareto search algorithm, then the
bargaining outcome will closely approximate a Pareto-efficient solution given a
wide variety of concession strategies.
In the system the seller agent uses an instance of the Pareto search algorithms
combined with a concession strategy. Although a customer is free to select other
bargaining strategies the system is set up such that it is actually in the best
interest of customers to have their agents use Pareto search strategies combined
with a concession strategy. We elaborate on this issue in the discussion in Section
5.
3.3 Orthogonal Strategy & DF
Both customer agent and seller agent may use— what we call— an orthogonal
strategy as the Pareto search algorithm. This strategy is probably best explained
through an example. Suppose, the customer (with whom the seller bargains over
the tariff) placed the tth offer of (pf (t), pv(t)). Moreover, the seller’s concession
strategy dictates an aspiration level of Us(t + 1): i.e., in utils the (counter) offer
should be worth Us(t + 1). Based on this information the orthogonal strategy
determines (pf (t + 1), pv(t + 1)), the counter offer of the seller, by choosing a
(pf , pv) combination that generates Us(t + 1) utils and lies closest (measured
in Euclidean distance) to the point (pf (t), pv(t)). Figure 4 gives the graphical
representation of the orthogonal strategy.
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Us*(t+1) 
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Fig. 4. Example of Orthogonal Strategy
The use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties results in a mapping f
from a bargainer’s aspiration level at t to the aspiration level at t + 2. Given
convex preferences (cf. [3]) and fixed aspiration levels the mapping f can be
shown to satisfy the Lipschitz condition ||f(x)−f(y)|| ≤ ||x−y|| for all x and y in
the domain of f .3 Thus, given fixed aspiration levels and convex preferences, the
orthogonal strategy does imply that consecutive offers do not diverge. (Note, that
convex preferences do not rule out changing preferences it only means that at
some point in time—i.e., during the bargaining process— the preference relation
is convex.) Figure 5 illustrates the use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties
3 The proof is a straightforward application of convex analysis (cf. [4]) given that
without loss of generality we can assume that the preferences are bounded. That is,
negative and extremely high (pf (t), pv(t)) combinations can be discarded, without
loss of generality.
for the case of tangent iso-utlity lines. It draws a sequence of two offers and
counter offers with convex preferences and a fixed aspiration level. (Us and Uc
denote the iso-utility lines of the seller and customer, respectively.) The figure
illustrates, for instance, how the customer’s offer at time 1 (with aspiration
level Uc(1) = Uc) is transformed into an offer at time 3 (with aspiration level
Uc(3) = Uc).
 
 
Uc 
Us 
pf 
pv 
pf* 
pv* 
1 
2 
3  4 
Fig. 5. Sequence of two offers and counter offers with fixed aspiration levels and convex
preferences, where (p∗f , p
∗
v) denotes a Pareto-efficient tariff.
The use of just the orthogonal strategy by both parties may lead to very
slow convergence to Pareto-efficient bargaining outcomes. To speed up the con-
vergence process we can add an amplifying mechanism to the orthogonal strat-
egy. As the amplifying mechanism we use the derivative follower with adaptive
step-size (ADF). (Henceforth we will call this the orthogonal-DF.)
The derivative follower (DF) is a local search algorithm (cf. [5]). It adjust the
variable price pv found by the orthogonal strategy by either subtracting or adding
δ to it depending on the result of the previous two adjustments, where δ is called
the step-size of the DF. Consequently also the fixed price pf changes because
the adjusted offer still needs to generate the same utility level (specified by the
concession strategy). The difference between ADF and DF is that the step-size δ
becomes adaptive [6, 7]. We use the ADF proposed by [7]. Intuitively, the idea is
to increment the step-size relatively far away from a Pareto-efficient solution and
decrement it in the vicinity of a Pareto-efficient solution. Consequently, a quicker
and more accurate search of the solution space becomes possible. Algorithm 1
specifies the orthogonal-DF in greater detail and figure 6 illustrates the use of the
orthogonal-DF by the seller (the customer uses the orthogonal strategy only).
4 Experimental Setup & Results
The previous sections outlined the general system for selling bundles of news
items to several customers through negotiation. As discussed in Section 3.2, ne-
gotiation essentially consists of two strategic aspects: the concession of the agents
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Fig. 6. Sequence of two offers and counter offers with fixed aspiration levels where the
seller uses the orthogonal-DF and the customer only uses the orthogonal strategy.
and the Pareto search method. In this section we focus on the latter aspect of the
negotiations. By means of computer experiments we investigate the effectiveness
and robustness of the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF approach, to find Pareto-
efficient solutions for a wide variety of settings. We evaluate the robustness of
the search strategy by experimenting with various concession strategies on the
customer side.
Although the system enables customers to initiate several concurrent negoti-
ation threads, within a thread the Pareto search strategy operates independently
from the other threads. For researching the efficiency and robustness of Pareto
search strategies it therefore suffices to consider only a single negotiation thread
in the experiments.
Furthermore, the bundle content in the experimental setup consists of a single
category with a low quality of service. The experimental results generalize to
negotiations involving multiple categories: Only the shape of the iso-utility curves
is affected by the number of categories. In the experiments the shape is varied
using different parameter settings.
A general specification of the customer agents and the seller agent was pro-
vided in Section 3. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe the agent settings which are
specifically used within the experimental setup. In particular the agents’ pref-
erences and concession strategies are specified in detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2
respectively. The experimental results are discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Agent Preference Settings
We simulate the negotiation with a variety of customer and seller preferences,
expressed by the agents’ utility functions. The customer agent’s expected utility
depends on ρ the total number of articles the customer expects to read in the low
quality of service categories (see also Section 3.1). The value ρ is assumed to be
a constant, set randomly between 1 and 20 at the beginning of the experiment.
Note that this results in a linear iso-utility curve in the (pf , pv) plane (see e.g.
Fig. 5). Furthermore, since the purpose is to demonstrate the efficiency of the
Algorithm 1 The orthogonal-DF algorithm
The following is given: (a) the opponent’s last and before last offer O1 = (pf (t), pv(t))
and O2 = (pf (t−2), pv(t−2)) respectively, (b) bargainer’s utility function u(pf , pv) and
next aspiration level U(t + 1), (c) the step-size δ, and (d) the search direction sdr ∈
{−1, +1}. Based on this information the orthogonal-DF computes the next counter
offer O = (pf (t + 1), pv(t + 1)).
1. Use the orthogonal strategy to compute O′1 = (p
′
f (t), p
′
v(t)) and O
′
2 = (p
′
f (t −
2), p′v(t−2)), i.e., the points in the (pf , pv) plane which generate U(t+1) utils and
lie closest to O1 and O2, respectively.
2. Compute d1 and d2 the distance of the opponent’s last two offers, i.e., d1 = ||O1 −
O′1|| and d2 = ||O2 − O
′
2|| (|| · || denotes Euclidian distance).
3. Update sdr: whenever d1 > d2 the orthogonal-DF “turns”, i.e., sdr = −1 · sdr,
otherwise sdr = sdr.
4. Update δ: decrease δ whenever the orthogonal-DF turns. For a number of periods
directly after a turn δ is not increased, and otherwise δ is increased (cf. [7] for the
details).
5. Compute the counter offer O = (pf (t+1), pv(t+1)): set pv(t+1) = p
′
v(t)+ δ · sdr.
Next choose pf (t + 1) such that given pv(t + 1) the counter offer generate U(t + 1)
utils.
final deals reached, we set the customer agent’s mandate bmax for the bundle
such that an agreement is always reached.
The expected utility (i.e., expected revenue) for the seller agent is based on
ρ, the expected number of articles that the customers will read on average in
the low quality categories. In contrast to the customer agent, the expectation
is not a constant but a function of the variable price pv . It is assumed that
customers who are willing to pay a high variable price are expected to read less
than customers with a low variable price (i.e. we assume the law of demand
holds cf. [3]). In the experiments we use the linear function ρ(pv) = b − a · pv
with b = 20 and a set randomly between 0.03 and 0.07 at the beginning of an
experiment. Note that the seller’s iso-utility curve is now convex (towards the
origin).
4.2 Concession Strategies
The customers and the seller can each select their own concession strategies.
Although a seller’s concession in the main system can depend on the behavior of
all customers (i.e., one-to-many), in the experiments the seller agent’s strategy is
simply to decrease the desired utility level or aspiration level with a fixed amount
each round. The initial aspiration level is randomly varied. Note that the number
of customers and their behavior does not affect the seller’s concession when this
strategy is used.
On the customer side, on the other hand, we implemented four classes of
concession strategies to investigate the robustness of the Pareto search strategy:
1. Hardhead. The customer agent does not concede when this strategy is used;
the aspiration level remains the same during the negotiations.
2. Fixed. A fixed amount c in utils is conceded each round.
3. Fraction. The customer concedes the fraction γ of the difference between the
current desired utility level and the utility of the opponent’s last offer.
4. Tit-for-tat. This strategy mimics the concession behavior of the opponent,
based on subjective utility improvement. If the utility level of the seller’s
offers increases, the same amount is conceded by the customer. Note that it
is the increment in the utility level perceived by the customer. The seller’s
actual concession is shielded from the customer agent, as an improvement
could also occur when the seller moves along his iso-utility curve. Further-
more, note that the perceived utility improvement could also be negative.
To make the concession behavior less chaotic, no negative concessions are
made by the customer.
4.3 Results
The seller and the customer in the experiments negotiate in an alternating fash-
ion until an agreement is reached. The efficiency of the agreement is then evalu-
ated based on the distance of the final offer from a Pareto-efficient solution. We
measure an offer’s distance from a Pareto-efficient solution as the maximum pos-
sible utility improvement for the customer if a Pareto-efficient offer was made, all
else remaining equal. To evaluate the quality of the results we compare the out-
Concession strategy Random search Orthogonal/DF search DF/DF search
hardhead 18.92 (±23.56) 8.03 (±11.44) 18.63 (±32.81)
fixed (c = 20) 26.52 (±34.49) 10.43 (±17.34) 28.82 (±46.71)
fixed (c = 40) 38.91 (±49.72) 16.21 (±23.84) 44.29 (±69.76)
fixed (c = 80) 42.12 (±56.88) 25.61 (±38.72) 48.84 (±72.12)
fraction (γ = 0.025) 30.26 (±38.37) 10.07 (±15.03) 32.25 (±52.81)
fraction (γ = 0.05) 31.53 (±40.00) 11.52 (±16.16) 28.52 (±52.13)
fraction (γ = 0.1) 37.81 (±48.82) 16.91 (±30.80) 26.28 (±42.20)
tit-for-tat 72.78 (±121.35) 59.60 (±113.27) 56.64 (±116.82)
Table 1. Average distance from Pareto-efficient solution for various customer con-
cession strategies (rows) and customer/seller search strategies (columns). Results are
averaged over 500 experiments with random parameter settings. Standard deviations
are indicated between brackets. Best results (see column Orthogonal/DF ) are obtained
if the customer and seller use orthogonal search, and the seller’s search is amplified with
a derivative follower.
comes using various search strategies and concession strategies of the customer.
Table 1 provides an overview of the results. The row labeled Random contains
the outcomes when both seller and customer use a random search strategy. This
strategy selects a random point on the iso-utility curve4. The distance of the
4 Only the downward sloping part of the seller’s iso-utility curve is used.
final offer (from the closest Pareto-efficient solution), when random search is
used, lies between 1 and 3 percent of the total costs.
Although the inefficiency with random search is only small compared to the
total costs, even better results are obtained when one bargainer (typically the
customer) uses orthogonal search and the other (the seller) uses orthogonal-
DF (i.e., orthogonal search combined with a derivative follower). The results
are shown in the column labeled Orthogonal/DF of Table 1. The improve-
ments are considerable. The distance of the final offer as a percentage of total
costs lies then, for almost all concession strategies, between 0 and 1. Only for
the tit-for-tat strategy the distance lies around 1.8 percent. Notice that the
Orthogonal/Orthogonal-DF strategy combination is also robust, as best results
are obtained using this strategy, relatively independent of the concession strategy
selected by the customer.
Table 1 also shows the results if both customer and seller use orthogonal-DF
search (column DF/DF ). These results are very similar to random, however. The
derivative follower relies on a consistent response from the opponent to signal
the right direction. If both use a derivative follower, this signal is distorted.
Notice that the average distance depends on the concession strategy used
by the customer. Although in individual cases Pareto-efficient agreements (with
zero distance) are reached using the orthogonal/DF search, the average distance
consistently shows some (usually slight) inefficiencies, even when the customer
makes no concessions (i.e., the hardhead strategy). The reason for this is twofold.
Firstly, the DF accelerates finding the efficient solution by making, at times,
large steps on the iso-utility curve. At a certain point the algorithm passed the
Pareto-efficient point, and then turns. This way the offers keep oscillating around
the optimal point. If the concessions are sufficiently large, an agreement can be
reached at a point which is less than optimal.
Secondly, the direction and step-size of the DF are based on changes in the
Euclidean distance between the seller and customer offers through time. The dis-
tance can be influenced by both concessions and movements along the iso-utility
curve. As the opponent’s iso-utility curve is unknown, the agents are unable to
distinguish between the two. This can mislead the DF whenever concessions are
very large. Two possible solutions are to make either small concessions, or have
intervals with no concessions allowing the search algorithm to find the best deal.
Particularly tit-for-tat results in a relatively high inefficiency, because of the
reasons described above. Recall that tit-for-tat uses a subjective measure of the
opponent’s concessions. In practice, the perceived utility increments are some-
times quite large, resulting in bursts of very large concessions. If this occurs near
the agreement point this can result in inefficient outcomes.
To conclude, the orthogonal/DF strategy clearly outperforms other combina-
tions of search strategies in the experiments. Inefficiencies still occur, especially if
the concessions are large. A trade-off therefore exists between reaching an agree-
ment fast (by making large concessions) and reaching an efficient agreement.
5 Discussion
5.1 The System Revisited
In the paper, we focus on the problem of selling bundles of news items. Clearly,
other types of (information) goods can also be sold through the developed sys-
tem. A key question for extending the use of the system to other application
areas is, however, if customers and (to a lesser degree) sellers are willing to have
(autonomous) agents do the actual bargaining for them. A prerequisite would
be that the traded goods have a relatively low value and transactions are con-
ducted frequently. Consequently, the risks are low and an agent has a lot of
opportunities to learn from past experience and gradually improve performance.
Note that the negotiation procedure of the system does not require both seller
and customer to use the same level of automation. Depending on the particular
application of the system, it may be desirable for the customer to rely more or
less on the assistant of the software agent.
An additional important aspect of the relevance to other application areas
is the potential benefit of using such a system. The developed system appears
particular suitable for selling (bundles) of goods with a high degree of person-
alization given relatively rapidly changing preferences (as is the case with the
news items). More specifically, in the system personalization entails discrimi-
nating between customers based on the bundle price and the quality of service.
Second-degree price discrimination is the economic term for this type of person-
alization.
In second-degree price discrimination the price depends on the quantity and-
/or quality of the purchased good. The distinguishing aspect of second-degree
price discrimination is that customers can self-select the best purchase. Tradi-
tionally, customers are offered a menu of options where a tariff assigns a price
to the option in the menu. The work of [8, 9] discusses algorithms which— given
a particular tariff structure— learn the best tariffs on-line. They conclude that
(especially in a dynamic environment) complex tariffs are generally not the most
profitable strategy.
The distinguishing aspect of the developed system is that instead of having
explicit tariffs customers can bargain for the most appropriate bundle tariff com-
bination. This can result in a similar (or even higher) degree of discrimination
between customers as with explicit complex tariff. In the absence of an explicit
tariff structure the seller is, however, more flexible in the degree to which she
discriminates. The seller does not have to a priori limit the complexity of the
tariff structure. Whenever bundles of (information) goods are being offered, an
additional advantage is that, by initiating the negotiation process, customers can
explicitly express their interest in a particular bundle of goods. This may facili-
tate the process of offering customers the appropriate bundles (and consequently
it may facilitate the discrimination between customers).
Possibly, bargaining leads to price discrimination based on customers’ bar-
gaining skills and not on their preferences. In the developed system this possi-
bility is, however, reduced significantly by the fairness constraint in particular
and the fact that bargaining is actually one-to-many in general.
5.2 Bargaining & Pareto Efficiency
In the system the seller agent uses the orthogonal-DF as the Pareto search strat-
egy combined with a concession strategy. The concession strategy determines
the next concession relatively independently of the ongoing bargaining process
with a particular customer. The idea is that, on the one hand, bargaining with
a particular customer should lead to finding the best possible deal for both
parties, given the seller’s desired utility level. That is, the bargaining outcome
should closely approximate a Pareto-efficient solution. On the other hand, the
one-to-many aspect of the bargaining process (i.e., bargaining with more than
one customer) should guide the updating of the concession strategy. Thus the
seller uses the disentanglement of the bargaining strategy (in a concession and
Pareto search strategy) to distinguish explicitly between the one-to-many and
one-to-one aspects of the bargaining process.
The experiments in Section 4 show that if a customer agent uses an or-
thogonal strategy as the Pareto-efficient search strategy then the bargaining
outcomes will closely approximate a Pareto-efficient solution. The experiments
are conducted for a variety of (customer) concession strategies, customer prefer-
ences, and seller preferences. Based on the experimental results we can conclude
that any other strategy choice of a customer will probably result in less efficient
outcomes. Moreover such a strategy will not influence the concession strategy of
the seller (due to the independence of the concession strategy). Consequently,
any alternative bargaining strategy of the customer is probably at most as good
as the orthogonal strategy combined with a concession strategy that mimics
the concessions of the alternative strategy. Thus, given the seller’s choice of the
orthogonal-DF combined with a relatively independent concession strategy, it is
in a customer’s best interest to choose the orthogonal search strategy combined
with a concession strategy. Moreover, this choice results in (a close approxima-
tion of) a Pareto-efficient solution.
5.3 Related Work
Related to our work, in [10] a heuristic approach to finding win-win trade-offs
between issues is introduced. Contracts which are similar to the opponent’s offer
are selected based on fuzzy similarity criteria. Their approach, however, is ap-
plied to additive utility functions with independent issues. The orthogonal search
method, on the other hand, operates on a more general class of utility functions,
which is widely accepted in the economic literature as a reasonable representa-
tion for ones preferences.5 Additionally, with an orthogonal search method no
(domain-specific) similarity function needs to be specified.
5 More specifically, with convex preferences the approach works particularly well.
Another approach increasingly used to automate one-to-many negotiations
is through auctions. Traditionally, auctions have focused on price as the single
dimension of the negotiation. Recently, however, multi-attribute auctions have
received increasing attention [11, 12]. Although our system has characteristics
similar to those of auctions, bundling and negotiation of information goods have
distinct properties which impede the use of current available auction designs.
Mainly, a bundle is not sold just once, but can be sold to any number of cus-
tomers in parallel, with varying contents and configurations. The buyers are also
unaware of other buyers in the system and their offers; they perceive the nego-
tiation to be one-on-one. Furthermore, we allow both offers and counter offers,
whereas auctions typically have less symmetry.
Rather than via direct negotiation, another way to find (Pareto) efficient
solutions for multi-issue problems is through a mediator, see for instance [13–16].
Both parties need to reveal their preferences to the mediator. With a mediator,
however, trust becomes an important issue. Furthermore, additional costs are
often involved.
6 Concluding Remarks
We introduce a novel system for selling bundles of news items in this paper.
Through the system, customers bargain over the price and quality of the de-
livered goods with the seller. The advantage of the developed system is that it
allows for a high degree of flexibility in the price, quality, and content of the
offered bundles. The price, quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for
example, differ based on daily dynamics and personal interest of customers.
The system as developed here can take into account business related side-
constraints, such as “fairness” of the bargaining outcomes. Partly due to these
side-constraints (especially fairness) the actual bargaining process between seller
and customers is not really one-to-one bargaining between seller and customer
but instead is one-to-many (i.e., between seller and customers).
Autonomous software agents perform (part of) the negotiation on behalf of
the users of the system. To enable efficient negotiation through these agents we
decompose the bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto search
strategies. Moreover, we introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy:
two Pareto search strategies. We show through computer experiments that the
respective use of these two Pareto search strategies by the two bargainers will
result in very efficient bargaining outcomes. Furthermore, the system is set up
such that it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their agent
adhere to this approach of decomposing the bargaining strategy into a concession
strategy and Pareto search strategy.
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